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The purpose of this guide is to help stakeholders in the 
City of Boston understand how regional electricity 
markets function in New England and Massachusetts, 
and to introduce some of the important choices about 
the design of those markets currently being discussed 
in the region.
The guide was prepared by the Conservation Law Foun-
dation for the Boston Green Ribbon Commission, a 
network of business and civic leaders supporting the 
implementation of the City of Boston’s Climate Action 
Plan (CAP). It is one of three information products com-
missioned by the GRC. The other two focus on: 1) an 
overview of how regional electricity and gas infrastruc-
ture decisions are made in New England, and 2) an 
overview of options for large scale institutional renew-
able energy purchasing.1 
The Boston Climate Action Plan has set aggressive goals 
for greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions for the 
City—25% by 2020 and 80% by 2050. For the first four 
years of its operation (November 2010—November 
2014), the GRC’s work in support of the climate mitiga-
tion goals of the City of Boston’s Climate Action Plan 
(CAP) has focused primarily on energy demand issues—
more specifically, reducing energy consumption and 
related GHG emissions in the large building and insti-
tutional sector (also known as the Commercial/Indus-
trial or C/I sector), and more recently, on reducing 
transportation-related emissions. 
Electricity and natural gas demand is, however, only half 
of the energy system equation. The other half is energy 
supply—where the energy comes from (generation of 
electricity and extraction of natural gas) and how it gets 
delivered to customer end-use points (transmission, 
pipelines and distribution). It is clear that there are a 
number of important choices that stakeholders will be 
making over the next decade affecting energy supply 
and distribution. It is important for GRC stakeholders to 
understand the state’s and region’s energy supply situ-
ation, what the choices are, how they will affect their 
energy plans, and the ability of the City to achieve its 
CAP goals.
The electricity and natural gas supply “ecosystem” in 
Boston, Massachusetts, and New England is compli-
cated and dynamic, and involves a myriad of issues, 
initiatives, and regulatory decision-making processes 
and procedures. A complex mix of players is involved, 
including the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), ISO-New England, the Department of Public 
Utilities, regional electricity and natural gas utilities, and 
energy suppliers from outside the region. 
The Green Ribbon Commission requested this study 
because an overview of regional electricity markets 
would be useful to its members and the many other 
stakeholders impacted by these issues, but who are not 
already deeply involved in them. This guide is designed 
to serve that purpose. Support for this report is provided 
by the Boston-based Barr Foundation as part of its 
climate program and efforts to advance clean energy 
in the region.
INTRODUCTION
1 All three of these reports are available for downloading from the “Materials” page on the Green Ribbon Commission web site. 
Green Ribbon Commission Report // CLF // A Guide to Electricity Markets, Systems, and Policy in Massachusetts 4
WHAT IS A UTILITY?
A “utility” is a special type of business that operates in 
an field in which a “natural monopoly” exists. The utility 
business model is the way society and the law attempt 
to address (and mitigate the effects of) this natural 
monopoly. 
Most businesses in the United States are governed by 
free enterprise. That is, most businesses are allowed to 
set their own prices and compete with one another 
freely. For example, if a person owns a Chevrolet deal-
ership, she can set her prices as high or as low as she 
wishes. A Chevy dealer, for example, might say, “I am 
going to set my prices very high in order to try to make 
a lot of money.” Or, she may say, “I am going to set my 
prices very low, and try to make up in increased volume 
what I am not making on individual sales.” In either 
event, the choice belongs to the business owner; and 
most business owners must compete with others in the 
same business.
Utilities are different. Utilities come about because of 
what are called “natural monopolies.” It would be 
unwise and economically inefficient for society to have 
more than one water company dig up our streets and 
put in a whole system of pipes to (separately) bring fresh 
water to every household in a city. Likewise, it would 
be unwise and economically inefficient to have more 
than one gas company dig up our streets and put in a 
whole system of pipes to (separately) bring natural gas 
to every household in the city. The same is true for elec-
tricity. The businesses that sell these commodities are 
“natural monopolies.”
Our society makes a two-part bargain with these natural 
monopolies. On the one hand, society makes an excep-
tion to the general no-monopoly rule that is the familiar 
pattern for nearly all other businesses. With utilities, we 
recognize the “natural monopoly” (because we do not 
want to have three water companies all tearing up the 
roads to install competing sets of pipes) and we allow 
the utility to maintain its monopoly. On the other hand, 
society limits how much these monopolies are permit-
ted to charge. Utilities are closely regulated by Public 
Utility Commissions (PUCs); these PUCs tell utilities 
how much they are allowed to charge and exactly how 
much profit they are allowed to make. Other businesses 
are not subject to the same degree of regulation.2 
REGULATION AND DEREGULATION
In the early days of electricity, most electricity utilities 
were “vertically integrated.” This meant that every geo-
graphical area in the country had only one electricity 
utility, and that utility fulfilled all three roles in the elec-
tricity grid: 
j	 Generation—Owning the power plants that burned 
coal, natural gas, oil, or some other fuel to make 
electricity;
j	 Transmission—Owning and operating the high 
voltage (often 500-, 345- or 230-kilovolt) lines that did 
the long-distance transmission of electricity from 
where it was made to where it was used; and
j	 Distribution—Owning and operating the lower 
voltage (usually 120- or 240-volt) lines and local trans-
formers responsible for actually distributing electricity 




Background: Utilities, Regulation, Deregulation, and the Electricity Bill 
2 Note that the names of these utilities commissions can vary slightly from state to state. Rhode Island and Maine have Public  
Utilities Commissions (PUCs); Massachusetts has the Department of Public Utilities (DPU); Connecticut has the Public Utilities  
Regulatory Agency (PURA). Despite these different names, these agencies all have substantially similar roles and functions.
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Starting in the 1990s, many states, including the New 
England states, passed laws that broke up these three 
separate functions and gave these separate functions 
to different companies. This process was called “dereg-
ulation.” In this context, this is what was meant by 
deregulation: distribution utilities were legally obligated 
to divest themselves of their generation assets. Those 
electricity generating power plants were sold to multi-
ple, private, non-utility companies in New England that 
compete against one another to sell their electricity 
onto the grid. The idea, or theory, behind deregulation 
was that competition in markets (including in electricity 
markets) is a good thing, and that competition could 
and would ultimately lower electricity rates for 
customers.
Today, as a result of deregulation, what most people 
think of as their “electricity utility” (such as National Grid 
or Eversource) is really just a “transmission and distri-
bution” company (T&D). The T&D utility performs the 
last two functions described above and owns the large 
transmission lines that are found in utility rights of way 
as well as the wires and poles in your neighborhood 
that bring the electricity to your home. 
As we will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 3 , Inde-
pendent System Operators (ISOs) have been created in 
recent years to design and operate the wholesale 
markets in this world of deregulated utilities.
THE ELECTRICITY BILL
In our current, deregulated utility world, the bills that 
electricity customers receive from their utilities are 
divided into several different line items. The two main 
parts of the bill are the commodity portion and the 
transmission and distribution portion. 
The commodity portion—For most electricity utilities 
and most electricity customers, the commodity portion 
of the bill is about two thirds of the electricity bill. (When 
discussing electricity utilities, the commodity that we 
are discussing is electricity; for gas utilities, the com-
modity is natural gas.) T&D utilities (like National Grid 
or Eversource) do not make or lose any money on the 
commodity portion of the electricity bill. This is a pure 
pass-through. T&D utilities buy electricity in the whole-
sale markets run by the ISO (see Chapter 3 ); these T&D 
utilities then pass their cost for that commodity—what-
ever that cost is—along to customers. Over the course 
of a year, the T&D utility makes zero dollars (and loses 
zero dollars) on the commodity portion of its custom-
ers’ bills.
Utility commissions may raise or lower the commodity 
cost to customers several times a year to ensure that 
the T&D utility ends up neither making nor losing money 
on the commodity portion of the bill over a period of 
time. It is important to understand that these rate pass-
throughs are required by law. Utility commissions have 
no discretion about passing along (to customers) the 
commodity costs paid by utilities for this commodity 
(electricity), but utilities also make no profit on this 
commodity.
So how do utilities make money?
The transmission and distribution portion—Utilities 
make money by charging for transmission and distri-
bution. The remaining portion (that is, non-commodity 
portion) of customers’ bills (amounting to about one 
third) is the transmission and distribution portion of the 
bill; that is, the portion of the bill related to the local, 
intra-state and inter-state transmission of electricity. 
Unlike the commodity portion of the electricity bill 
(which is a pure pass-through), the amount of money 
that regulated utilities are allowed to charge on the 
transmission and distribution portion of the bill is con-
trolled by utility commissions and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC). PUCs can adjust dis-
tribution rates upward or downward in a regulatory pro-
ceeding called a “rate case.” In theory, a utility should 
be able to cover two different types of costs through 
the transmission and distribution portion of a bill. First, 
a utility covers all of its operating costs through the dis-
tribution charges. For an electricity utility, this means 
the cost of maintaining the actual electricity grid 
CHAPTER 1 Deregulation
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(including all the wires, transformers, and substations), 
the cost of staff salaries, operating its buildings, running 
its billing system, and so forth. Second, a utility makes 
its profit on the transmission and distribution side of 
a bill.
UTILITY PROFIT: ROE
The profit that a utility is allowed to earn is defined by 
the technical term “Return on Equity” (ROE). The equity 
that a utility has is the dollar value of its physical assets. 
For an electricity utility, that is the value of its wires, 
transformers, substations, and so forth. For a gas utility, 
that is the value of its pipes, compressors, and so forth.
In a utility rate case, the PUC sets the level of Return on 
Equity that the utility is allowed to earn (until the next 
rate case is conducted). Utility ROEs commonly run 
between about 8% and about 12%. If an electricity utility 
is allowed an ROE of 8% by the local PUC, you add up 
the total value of the distribution utility’s wires, trans-
formers, substations, and physical plant; then multiply 
that amount by 8%; and the product of that multiplica-
tion is the ROE (profit) that that utility is permitted. Sim-
ilarly, FERC approves ROEs for T&D investments 
associated with interstate transmission lines. This ROE 
or profit is designed to motivate the utility to invest in 
infrastructure improvements and to inspire investors to 
invest in the utility. 
Utility commission rate cases are extremely compli-
cated, and it is beyond the purview of this pamphlet to 
describe (or discuss) how rate cases are conducted. 
Here it will suffice to acknowledge the fact that there 
are competing interests at work. For example, society 
wants the electricity system to be safe and reliable; no 
one wants blackouts. This factor encourages more 
spending on infrastructure (in order to ensure safety 
and reliability). On the other hand, no one wants to 
over-spend on the system by “gold-plating” every part 
of the system. This factor encourages less spending on 
electricity infrastructure. Striking the proper balance 
between spending enough to keep the system safe and 
reliable, but not over-charging customers by spending 
more than necessary—that is one of the principal jobs 
of utility commissions in rate cases. 
CHAPTER 1 Deregulation
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Renewable electricity technologies are generally newer 
than technologies that use fossil fuels; thus the markets 
for these forms of electricity generation have not been 
as robust as those for more traditional generation. Con-
sequently, commercial developers of renewable energy 
projects can have a hard time securing the financing 
needed to build a project like a wind farm or a large 
solar array. Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) are 
one way for state governments to support the con-
struction of renewable energy projects. This chapter 
will explain what RPS statutes are and how they work. 
Massachusetts was one of the first states to enact an 
RPS statute, in November 1997; California was another 
early adopter, in 2002. Today, five of the six New 
England states have mandatory RPS laws (and the sixth, 
Vermont, has a voluntary renewable energy goal). In all, 
29 states have mandatory RPS laws, including New 
York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Ohio, Illinois, Arizona, and 
New Mexico. These RPS statutes are written into state 
law, because there is no federally mandated RPS at the 
national level. 
RPS LAWS: THREE KEY FEATURES
Although there are variations that exist between the RPS 
statutes of different states, all RPS laws utilize the same 
three basic features: mandates, Renewable Energy Cer-
tificates, and Alternative Compliance Payments. 
MANDATES
Every RPS law starts by creating a mandate, or obliga-
tion, that electricity utilities buy a certain percentage of 
their electricity from renewable energy sources. Those 
obligations increase over time, usually annually. Some 
states also provide that the rate of annual increase will 
also increase over time. In addition, RPS statutes specify 
what counts as being “renewable.” Massachusetts and 
Rhode Island’s RPS statutes provide an illustration.
The Massachusetts RPS statute was signed into law in 
November 1997, and appears at Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
25A, § 11F. The law required that a baseline be set of the 
amount of renewables in the system as of two years 
after enactment, by December 31, 1999. Then, starting 
in 2003, utilities had to increase the amount of renew-
ables from that baseline by one half percent per year, 
every year between 2003 and 2009; and then increase 
the quantity of renewables by one percent per year, 
every year after 2009. (That is, the amount of renew-
ables increases every year; and the annual rate of 
increase went up once, in 2009.) The statute specifies 
what counts as “renewables”—among other technolo-
gies, solar photo-voltaic cells (PV), wind, geothermal, 
and landfill gas. 
The Rhode Island RPS statute was enacted in June 
2004, and appears at R. I. Gen. Laws § 39-26-1, et seq. 
The law specified that, starting in 2007, utilities had to 
procure three percent of their electricity load from 
renewables. The annual percentage goes up one half 
percent per year between 2008 and 2010, then the rate 
of increase goes up to one percent per year between 
2011 and 2014 and one and a half percent per year 
between 2015 and 2019. This should yield 16% of elec-
tricity sold in Rhode Island coming from renewables in 
2019. Like the Massachusetts statute (and others), the 
Rhode Island law specifies what counts as renewable 
energy—again solar PV, wind, geothermal, and landfill 
gas, among others. 
Note that there is generally some lead time between 
when the RPS statute is enacted and when it first goes 
into effect. In Massachusetts, that lead time was six 
CHAPTER 2
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years: the RPS statute was passed in 1997, but the first 
obligation did not apply until 2003. In Rhode Island, the 
RPS statute was passed in 2004, but did not go into 
effect until 2007. Note also that the annual increases in 
the renewable mandates in RPS laws are incremental 
and distinctly modest, sometimes as little as an addi-
tional one half percent per annum. Both of these factors 
stem from a recognition that the planning, siting, per-
mitting, and construction of all electricity facilities—
including renewable energy facilities—take time. 
Nevertheless, how aggressive the rate of annual 
increase should be continues to be a matter of pub-
lic-policy debate; environmentalists have consistently 
argued that RPS statutes could become effective sooner 
and could ramp up faster.
RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES (RECS)
RPS statutes create “Renewable Energy Certificates” 
(RECs). These RECs are virtual documents, not real 
paper documents. Every renewable energy generator 
(say, the owner of a wind farm) creates one REC for 
every megawatt-hour (MWh) of renewable energy she 
produces. 
RECs serve two important functions in the broader 
scheme of RPS statutes: keeping track of renewable 
energy purchased, and funding renewable energy 
development.
j	 RECs are the accounting system by which utilities 
demonstrate their compliance with RPS laws. Each year, 
utilities with RPS mandates buy enough RECs to satisfy 
their RPS obligation for that year. This is how the public 
(and the state utility commission) know that the utility 
has complied with its RPS mandate under the law; it is 
the utility’s purchase of RECs that demonstrates 
compliance.
To illustrate with a couple of simple examples: if 
National Grid is the utility, and Grid sells 100 MWh of 
electricity in, say, Rhode Island this year, and Grid’s RPS 
obligation (under Rhode Island law) this year is 7%, Grid 
must purchase 7 RECs in order to satisfy its obligation. 
The calculation is simple: 7% of 100 = 7. If next year the 
RPS obligation ramps up to, say, 8% of Grid’s load, and 
Grid sells 110 MWh of electricity, then next year Grid 
must buy 8.8 RECs, because 8% of 110 = 8.8. 
j	 RECs create a second stream of income for renew-
able energy generators. All electricity generators have 
one main source of revenue and income: they sell their 
electricity and get paid for it. If you produce electricity, 
whether it is from coal or from wind, you will get paid 
for selling that electricity. But renewable generators 
have a second commodity to sell: RECs; and RPS laws 
have created a mandatory market for that second com-
modity because utilities must buy RECs in order to 
satisfy their annual RPS obligations. This is the way RPS 
laws create a financial incentive for renewable energy.
RECs can be used in other ways, too, because, like 
many commodities, there is a secondary market for 
RECs. For example, in 2006, the Okemo ski area, in 
Ludlow, Vermont, advertised that it was using 100% 
renewable energy to run its lifts and light its ski lodges. 
The way Okemo could do this was that it bought 
enough RECs to off-set 100% of its electricity con-
sumption. In fact, any individual home-owner or renter, 
business, college, or other institution can use 100% 
renewable electricity—by buying enough RECs every 
year to match its electricity use.
There are also companies that serve as “REC aggrega-
tors.” One such company, in Massachusetts, is Mass 
Energy; its affiliate in Rhode Island is called People’s 
Power & Light (PP&L). Each of these companies has 
thousands of individual electricity customers who are 
members. When you sign up to be a customer of one 
of these REC aggregators, you continue to get your 
electricity from your regular utility (say, National Grid 
or NSTAR), and you continue to receive a monthly bill 
from that utility. However, the bill that you receive will 
have one additional line item on it with a small, addi-
tional, incremental charge. That extra money will go to 
Mass Energy (or PP&L), which will use that money to 
buy enough RECs to offset 100% of your personal use 
CHAPTER 2 Renewable Portfolio Standards
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of electricity. These entities are called “REC aggrega-
tors” because they buy RECs for all of their thousands 
of customers. In this way, any customer can elect to 
use 100% renewable energy in her home. 
ALTERNATIVE COMPLIANCE PAYMENTS
What if a utility under an RPS mandate wants to comply 
with the law (that is, buy RECs), but there just are no 
RECs on the market? In theory, this can happen if and 
when there are not enough renewable energy genera-
tors producing RECs. That’s where Alternative Compli-
ance Payments (ACPs) come in. RPS statutes allow 
utilities to satisfy their RPS obligations by making a 
payment in lieu of purchasing RECs, known as an ACP. 
Often these ACPs go into a state’s Renewable Energy 
Fund. The cost of ACPs varies from state to state, but 
generally cost about $60 per MWh each. 
ACPs play two crucial roles in the overall RPS arrange-
ment: continued financial support for state renewables 
development programs, and serving as a price ceiling 
for RECs. 
j	 State Renewable Energy Funds use their money to 
help fund new renewable energy projects. (Remember: 
ACPs must be purchased/paid if there are not enough 
RECs on the market.) Thus, if there is ever a shortage of 
RECs on the market, money paid in the ACP is used to 
build new renewable energy resources, so that the REC 
shortage disappears in future years. That is, ACPs are a 
self-correcting mechanism that fix REC shortages if 
such shortages ever occur.
j	 ACPs also effectively set a ceiling price on RECs, so 
that the entire RPS program can never get too expen-
sive for customers. If market forces (that is, supply and 
demand) were ever to cause REC prices to rise above 
the ACP price (about $60 per MWh), utilities could 
simply make an Alternative Compliance Payment 
(instead of buying those too-expensive RECs).
ALL THREE PARTS OF THE RPS  
WORK TOGETHER
In practice, the three parts of these RPS statutes work 
together to form a coherent whole:
j	 The first part of the RPS construct legally mandates 
electricity utilities to procure renewable energy; the 
obligation ramps up over time; and the law defines what 
counts as “renewable.” 
j	 The second part of the RPS construct creates RECs. 
RECs function as an accounting tool to ensure compli-
ance by the utility, and create a second stream of 
income going to owners of renewable energy genera-
tion. This is crucial, because renewable energy is still 
generally more expensive than electricity from fossil 
fuels. 
j	 The third part of the RPS construct creates ACPs. 
ACPs put a cap on REC prices, so the program can 
never get too expensive; and Renewable Energy Funds 
function to correct any temporary shortages that may 
occur in the REC market by funding new renewable 
energy generation.
RPS statutes have existed for close to two decades, and 
they have proved to be a highly effective means of 
getting real renewable energy projects built. 
CONTROVERSIES
RPS statutes do not address every issue pertaining to 
renewable energy. We consider here some controver-
sies that exist around RPS statutes.
CHAPTER 2 Renewable Portfolio Standards
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Long-Term Contracts—While renewable energy devel-
opers often need long-term contracts (called “Power 
Purchase Agreements”) with utilities (by which they sell 
both the energy that they generate and RECs) in order 
to secure sufficient funding for their projects, many 
(perhaps most) utilities elect to buy only RECs on the 
spot market. This does not help renewable developers 
as much as it could, and some states (such as Massa-
chusetts and Rhode Island) have supplemented RPS 
statutes with separate laws requiring utilities to enter 
into long-term contracts for renewable energy.
Cost—As discussed above, RPS statutes (using the REC 
mechanism) create a second stream of income that 
goes to renewable energy developers. This is paid for 
by a small additional charge paid by every electricity 
customer. This fact has led some customer advocates 
and advocates for low-income customers to oppose 
RPS statutes. There is no gainsaying the fact that RPS 
programs cost customers money; of course, environ-
mentalists argue that the significant carbon-emission 
reductions and other environmental benefits are worth 
the slight extra cost up front. (And see Chapter 5 for 
discussion of how renewable energy sources can 
reduce prices in organized electricity markets like New 
England’s.)
Rate of Increase—There are, of course, always discus-
sions about what the appropriate or “correct” rate of 
annual ramp-up should be for these statutes. And while 
it is certainly true that renewable energy costs more 
than electricity from fossil fuels, it is also true that one 
of the benefits of RPS statutes is that the per-unit cost 
of renewable energy projects comes down as these 
statutes force build-outs of renewable energy projects 
over time, technology improves, and economies of 
scale are realized.
Uneven National Effects—Although a majority of states 
now have RPS statutes, many states do not. Moreover, 
there is a national patch-work of statutes that contain 
different ramp-up rates and that allow different tech-
nologies to be considered “renewable.” While the 29 
existing state RPS statutes have been extremely effec-
tive in getting renewable energy projects built and 
operating, a patchwork of different state laws is not a 
substitute for a coherent national policy. 
CHAPTER 2 Renewable Portfolio Standards
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WHAT IS THE ISO?
“ISO” (or “ISO-NE”) is the acronym for the Independent 
System Operator-New England. The ISO is an indepen-
dent, non-profit corporation that is responsible for 
keeping the lights on in New England. It is based in 
Holyoke, Massachusetts, where it has a control room 
that operates the electricity grid for the six New England 
states. ISO-NE has an annual budget of $146.6 million 
(in 2015), and 586 staff people. The staff includes elec-
tricity engineers, economists, and other technical 
experts.
ISO-NE ORIGINS AND AUTHORITY
Interstate markets in electricity are regulated by the 
federal government under the Federal Power Act (FPA), 
originally passed in 1935. The FPA created the Federal 
Power Commission; in 1977, Congress amended the 
FPA to change the Federal Power Commission into the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and 
gave FERC expanded powers. Today FERC oversees 
interstate wholesale energy markets and transmission 
systems under the authority of the FPA.
In 1996, FERC issued what it called Order 888, which 
encouraged the creation of ISOs to run and oversee 
electricity wholesale markets, which were then emerg-
ing as states were increasingly moving to restructure 
the power generation sector to rely on competitive 
markets rather than vertically integrated utilities. (See 
Chapter 1 – Deregulation.) In the late 1990s, New 
England states enacted laws restructuring the power 
generation sector in whole or in part. (See Chapter 1.) 
In 1997, in response to FERC Order 888, ISO-NE was 
formed.
There are other ISOs in the country, including New York 
ISO (NYISO), California ISO (CAISO), and Midwest ISO 
(MISO). PJM Interconnection LLC is the ISO for all or 
parts of 13 states that originally included New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Maryland (but has now expanded to 
additional states). The top map on page 16 shows the 
geographical footprint of ISO-NE; the bottom map on 
page 16 shows the footprint of all the ISOs in the 
country. ISOs cover about three-quarters of the United 
States; in the remaining quarter of the country, vertically 
integrated utilities own and operate all aspects of the 
electricity system without an ISO.
WHAT DOES ISO-NE ACTUALLY DO?
As it says on its website, ISO-NE performs three distinct, 
but inter-related roles. See http://www.iso-ne.com/
about/what-we-do/three-roles.
The three roles that the ISO performs are: (1) operates 
the electricity grid in real time; (2) designs and admin-
isters the markets that set wholesale electricity prices; 
and (3) plans for the future of the grid and the markets. 
Let’s take a look at each of these functions. 
1. ISO OPERATES THE ELECTRICITY GRID IN 
REAL TIME
First, ISO-NE runs the New England electricity grid in 
real time. There are approximately 81 large power gen-
eration facilities in New England, and it is the ISO that 
decides which ones are on and which ones are off for 
every one of the 8,760 hours in the year. The process of 
deciding whether a generator will be on or off is called 
“unit commitment.” The ISO “commits” a power plant 
when it directs a power plant operator to turn that unit 
CHAPTER 3
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on. Merely deciding which units to commit and when is 
a very (very!) difficult task, because 280 is a very large 
number, indeed. That is, there are 280 different combi-
nations of ways that the 80-plus power plants in New 
England can all be either on or off at any given time. 
Running the grid in real time also involves deciding how 
to “dispatch” each generator—that is increasing or 
decreasing its power output (once it is committed). 
Most generators are able to produce different amounts 
of electricity; the process of telling a generator to 
produce more (or less) is called “dispatching” that gen-
erator up (or down). (Technically, “unit commitment” is 
the correct nomenclature for the on/off decision; and 
“dispatch” is the correct nomenclature for ramping up 
or down. However, colloquially, the “dispatchability” of 
a generator is often understood to mean whether an 
ISO can turn it on or off at will.)
Because electricity cannot be stored in significant 
quantities using existing technology, the ISO must keep 
the output of all 80-plus generators in New England 
equal to the consumption (called “load”) of all 13 million 
New England electricity customers for every hour of 
the year. This, too, is complicated, in part because load 
varies hour by hour, minute by minute, and second by 
second as millions of end-use customers turn millions 
of electric appliances on or off.
Running the grid in real time is made even more com-
plicated by the fact that not every generator is equally 
able to send electricity to every geographical location 
in New England. In particular, there are transmission 
constraints on the New England electricity grid that 
make it difficult to get electricity into or out of certain 
geographical areas. One of the better known 
export-constrained geographical zones is the state of 
Maine; there are not enough high-voltage transmission 
lines to get the full output of wind farms and other 
power plants out of Maine and to the rest of New 
England. One of the better-known import-constrained 
zones is NEMA-Boston (see top map on page 14); there 
are not enough high voltage transmission lines to move 
power freely into this area during certain hours of the 
year. (“NEMA” is an acronym for “North Eastern Massa-
chusetts.” The NEMA-Boston load zone is, as the name 
implies, in northeastern Massachusetts, including some 
of the northern Boston suburbs.) In fact, there are over 
1,200 small, geographical pockets around New England 
that have some type of transmission constraint under 
certain system conditions.
2. ISO ADMINISTERS THE MARKETS THAT SET 
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES
Second, ISO-NE runs the wholesale electricity markets 
in New England that ultimately determine the retail 
rates for electricity that will be paid by all end-use elec-
tricity customers in New England. These wholesale 
markets can be divided into three sub-categories: (1) 
electricity; (2) capacity; and (3) regulation.
The electricity market, in turn, is divided into a Day 
Ahead Energy Market and a Real Time Energy Market. 
Electricity utilities that distribute power to households 
and businesses (also called “Load-Serving Entities,” or 
“LSEs”) get much of their electricity (about 65%) from 
generators in the form of medium-term or long-term 
contracts of varying lengths of time. These contracts 
are handled outside the ISO markets, and long-term 
contracts typically must be approved by the state public 
utilities commission that regulates the LSE’s services. 
The LSEs then buy most of the rest of the electricity that 
they need to serve load (about 30% of the total) in the 
Day Ahead Energy Market. The remaining electricity 
that the LSEs need to serve load (only about 5% of the 
total) is purchased in the Real Time Energy Market. 
ISO-NE tries to keep electricity prices as low as possible 
by buying the cheapest power first; for a more detailed 
discussion of how electricity prices are set in the Day 
Ahead and Real Time markets, see Chapter 5. The total 
value of the electricity market in New England is about 
$9.1 billion per year. This works out to an average of 
about 6.2¢ per kilowatt-hour (KWh); however, actual 
rates vary between different rate classes (for instance 
big industrial entities are charged in a different way than 
residential customers) and between different geo-
graphical locations.
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Whereas the electricity market involves the sale of 
actual electrons flowing through wires, the capacity 
market is different. The capacity market involves a com-
mitment to produce electricity at a time three years in 
the future if called upon by the ISO to do so. Under 
federal law, the ISO is responsible for system “reliability,” 
and, through the capacity market, ISO ensures that 
there will be enough generators on the system in the 
future to produce enough electricity to keep the lights 
on (that is, to meet the anticipated load). This ability and 
willingness to produce electricity in the future is called 
“capacity”—it is really the capacity (willingness and 
ability) to produce power in the future (if called upon 
by the ISO to do so). The capacity market is significant; 
while for many years, this ran to just over a billion dollars 
a year, in 2015 the capacity auction cleared at over $3 
billion for future capacity (or over 2¢ per KWh). For a 
more detailed discussion of the capacity market (includ-
ing the “Forward Capacity Auction,” descending clock, 
and “Pay for Performance,”) see Chapter 5I.
In contrast to the electricity and capacity markets, both 
of which are very large and involve billions of dollars 
per year, the regulation market is relatively small—only 
about $326 million per year in New England (or 0.2 ¢ 
per KWh). In the regulation market, specially equipped 
generators respond to instructions from the ISO to 
increase or decrease their output every four seconds, 
in order to keep the proper voltage on the entire elec-
tricity grid. While the regulation market is relatively small 
in dollar value, it is a necessary and important part of 
running the electricity grid in real time and keeping the 
lights on for all New Englanders.
All three of these markets are run by ISO-NE: the elec-
tricity market (both Day Ahead and Real Time), the 
Capacity Market, and regulation market. And the sum 
total of these three markets set the prices that all 
end-use electricity customers in New England pay for 
the electricity they use. 
3. ISO PLANS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE GRID 
AND THE MARKETS
Third, ISO-NE does planning for the future. For example, 
the ISO has to make a prediction every year about how 
much electricity capacity to buy for the future. In order 
to do that, the ISO must look at how much electricity 
is needed in New England now; then estimate how 
much load growth there may be in the future; then cal-
culate how much of that anticipated growth may be 
offset by energy efficiency and small distributed renew-
able energy (like rooftop solar installations on individual 
homes).
The ISO’s planning also includes deciding how much 
new transmission is going to be needed (and where). 
The ISO bases these decisions on many factors, includ-
ing where population centers are developing and where 
new generation assets (power plants) are being located.
The ISO’s planning also involves making necessary (or 
desirable) adjustments to market rules to accommodate 
new developments in the electricity grid. For example, 
in recent years the ISO has changed market rules to 
accommodate integration of intermittent renewable 
resources such as wind and solar power. 
NEPOOL AND ITS ROLE
NEPOOL is the acronym for the “New England Power 
Pool.” NEPOOL was established in 1971 and consists of 
a wide range of “Market Participants” including electric-
ity generators, owners of transmission, and customers. 
For many years, NEPOOL served many of the functions 
that ISO-NE serves today.
As noted above, in 1996, FERC, in its Order 888, encour-
aged the creation of ISOs. In 1997, in response to the 
FERC Order, NEPOOL created ISO-NE as an indepen-
dent, nonprofit corporation, governed by its own Board 
of Directors. From then on (continuing today), NEPOOL 
has served as the official stakeholder group of ISO-NE. 
CLF is a full member of NEPOOL, and it is through its 
membership in NEPOOL that CLF can, and sometimes 
does, influence the ISO’s decision-making process.
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The relationship between ISO-NE and NEPOOL is a 
formal, legal relationship that is governed by an 83-page 
legal document called the “Participants Agreement.” In 
actual practice, these are the major, salient points of 
the relationship between the ISO and NEPOOL:
The ISO is obligated by law to consult with NEPOOL 
whenever ISO wants to change the written rules that 
govern the way it operates the electricity grid or any of 
the markets. In fact, ISO consults extensively with 
NEPOOL at formal meetings that occur multiple times 
every month. 
All changes to the written rules that govern the way ISO 
operates the grid or the markets must be submitted to 
NEPOOL for a vote before the ISO can file a request for 
those changes with FERC. To be clear, NEPOOL agree-
ment with a rule change proposed by the ISO is not 
required; ISO can (and sometimes does) ask FERC for 
rule changes that NEPOOL opposes. But FERC takes 
NEPOOL’s views into account in making its decisions 
about ISO requests; and sometimes FERC will agree 
with NEPOOL, not ISO. For example, in December 2014, 
ISO and NEPOOL disagreed on the amount of capacity 
that should be bought in Forward Capacity Auction-9 
(FCA-9), to be held in February 2015. (For background 
on what FCA-9 is, see Chapter 6.) In FERC’s decision, 
issued in January 2015, FERC agreed in part with ISO, 
but also agreed in part with NEPOOL. (CLF has addi-
tional information on the meaning of FERC’s decision 




Importantly, NEPOOL members (like CLF) have legal 
standing to challenge ISO decisions before FERC. In 
notable cases, FERC has sided with CLF and against ISO. 
For example, in 2010, CLF brought a challenge before 
FERC of an ISO decision not to close down the dirty, 
old Salem Harbor (Massachusetts) coal-fired power 
plant; ISO believed that the plant was needed to keep 
the New England electricity grid reliable. In December 
2010, FERC sided with CLF and against ISO. As a result, 
Salem Harbor coal plant was shut down by its owners.
Everything ISO-NE does is ultimately governed by the 
FPA and is overseen by FERC. When the ISO wants to 
change its rules that pertain to any of its functions 
(running the grid itself, and running the wholesale 
markets that set prices), the ISO must file those changes 
with FERC, and wait to implement the proposed 
changes until FERC has approved them. 
WORKING WITH BOTH ISO AND NEPOOL
CLF is almost alone among environmental organiza-
tions because CLF participates actively in both ISO 
planning groups (such as the ISO’s Planning Advisory 
Committee, Distributed Generation Forecast Working 
Group, and Energy Efficiency Forecast Working Group) 
and NEPOOL committees (such as the NEPOOL Par-
ticipants Committee, Markets Committee, Reliability 
Committee and Transmission Committee). 
CLF has two primary interests in working with the ISO. 
First (as reflected above), CLF works to close down dirty 
power plants that are fired by coal and other car-
bon-emitting fossil fuels. As the operator of the New 
England electricity grid, the ISO makes initial decisions 
as to whether these plants can safely close down and 
exit the market. Second, CLF works to promote clean 
renewable energy such as solar and wind. Many renew-
able energy sources are intermittent; and the ISO is the 
entity that writes the rules and does the planning that 
is necessary to integrate these intermittent renewable 
energy resources into the power grid.
While often quite technical, CLF’s extensive work with 
the ISO and with NEPOOL is both exciting and mean-
ingful, for this is an important place where CLF achieves 
real-world, tangible results in moving New England and 
the United States away from dirty, carbon-emitting 
fossil fuels into a cleaner renewable-energy future. 
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FIGURE 1. Geographic footprint of Independent 
System Operator of New England (ISO-NE)
FIGURE 2. Geographic Footprint of all ISOs in the U.S.
Source: Adapted from Energy Velocity, October 2013.
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Like many regions in the United States, New England 
once obtained most of its electricity from coal and oil. 
Over the past two decades, New England’s electricity 
system has been ahead of some other parts of the 
country in shedding its dependence on the dirtiest fossil 
fuels. New England is currently undergoing a transition 
to an electricity system that features renewable power, 
but it is still dependent on fossil fuels for over half of its 
power. 
The dominant fuel used to generate electricity in New 
England is natural gas. As the chart below shows, gas 
generation accounts for about 46% of electricity in New 
England, nearly as much as every other fuel combined. 
Nuclear power accounts for about 33%, large Canadian 
hydro power about 6%, and other renewables (exclud-
ing large hydropower) are about 8%.
TABLE 1. Regional electricity generating capacity 
and energy production by fuel type









Other renewables  
(excl. large hydro)
8%
It is important to remember that ISO-NE runs a single, 
unitary electricity grid that covers all six New England 
states. (See Chapter 3 .) Within that grid, electricity 
flows, essentially, from all generators to all end-use 
customers. 
Thus, the fuel mix reflected in the chart above is iden-
tical for every state in New England, and for every city 
and county in every state. Thus, for example, the elec-
tricity actually used in Maine or Rhode Island is about 
33% from nuclear power, even those two states do not 
have a single nuclear generating station. Similarly, 
although the very small state of Rhode Island has only 
gas-fired generators within the state’s borders, the 
electricity consumed by end-use customers in Rhode 
Island is still the same fuel mix as the rest of New 
England (which is over 50% non-gas-generated). The 
idea that the kinds of power plants or other power 
supply sources within the borders of a state that 
produce electricity is the same as the fuel mix that is 
consumed within the state is a common misconception 
among policymakers and the press. 
Over the past 15 years, the relative percentages of fuels 
in the New England fuel mix have changed significantly; 
the chart below depicts these changes.
CHAPTER 4
Fuel Mix in New England
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Several specific changes are worth noting. First, the 
percentage of electricity made using natural gas has 
increased dramatically. As a result, electricity prices in 
New England are now closely linked to the price of 
natural gas. Second, the percentage of electricity from 
the two dirtiest fossil fuels—oil and coal—has dropped 
dramatically, from a combined total of 40% in 2000 to 
under 7% today.3
At the same time that dirty oil- and coal-fired genera-
tors have been leaving the market, there has been a 
dramatic and sustained increase in the amount of clean, 
renewable generation seeking to enter the New England 
electricity market. The following chart shows ISO-NE’s 
so-called “interconnection queue,” the list of new gen-
erators seeking to connect to New England’s electricity 
grid. As you can see, 42% of this proposed new elec-
tricity, nearly 4,000 megawatts (MW), comes from wind. 
This is about 400% more than the current total of all 
renewable resources (other than large hydropower) in 
New England now.
It is also important to note that the rest of the list of 
projects attempting to break into the New England 
market is largely made up of natural gas plants. The 
growth of renewable energy in New England may slow 
if public investments in natural gas supply capacity arti-
ficially decrease the price of natural gas-powered elec-
tricity. For more on how the prices of a particular kind 
of generation can affect the economics of other kinds 
of generation, see Chapter 5 – Electricity Prices.













Note: Some natural gas include dual-fuel units (oil)
3 This is, in significant part, because of CLF’s Coal-Free New England campaign, which involved bringing a series of successful lawsuits 
against the owners of coal-fired power plants.
FIGURE 3. Dramatic Changes in the Energy Mix
The fuels used to produce New England’s electric  
energy have shifted as a result of economic and 
environmental factors
Percent of Total Electric Energy Production by Fuel Type 
(2000 vs. 2013)





















Source: ISO New England 2014 Regional Electricity Outlook
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The price of electricity is based on many factors. At 
times we hear about the high cost of new renewable 
electricity, but in fact our region’s reliance on renew-
able power is helping both to reduce pollution and 
bring down the cost of electricity.
This chapter examines how electricity prices are set in 
New England. We explain what the so-called “bid stack” 
is, and we discuss one of the chief benefits of renewable 
energy resources—not the environmental benefits, but 
the economic benefits to customers due to the overall 
price-reduction effect of renewable resources. (This 
price-reduction effect is sometimes referred to in the 
technical literature as a “price-suppression effect.”)
HOW ELECTRICITY PRICES ARE SET
ISO-NE runs the wholesale electricity markets in New 
England, both the Real Time Energy Market, and the 
Day Ahead Energy Market; it is these markets that 
directly determine how much customers and utilities in 
New England pay for electricity. (Customers include all 
ratepayers—that is, all classes of customers, including 
residential customers, commercial customers (such as 
businesses), and industrial customers (such as facto-
ries).) (See Chapter 3 for background on ISO-NE.)
The ISO sets electricity prices hourly, with the price for 
each hour set by the most expensive marginal resource 
(generator) to be committed for that hour. That is, 
during every one of the 8,760 hours in a year, the ISO 
“turns on” the least expense generators first, and turns 
on the most expensive generators last. The last gener-
ator to be committed (“committed” is the technical term 
for “turned on”) sets the price that will be received by 
every generator that is committed during that hour.
Every generator bids in to these hourly markets, offering 
to sell its electricity at a certain price. Some generators 
will bid in at, say, 3¢ per kilowatt-hour (KWh); others 
may bid in at, say, 5¢ per KWh; others at, say, 10¢ per 
KWh; and so on. The ISO always arranges the bids in 
order of cost; and the ISO always “accepts” the lowest 
bids first. As noted above, this process of arranging the 
bids in sequential order, with the lowest bids first and 
the most expensive bids last, creates what the ISO calls 
the “bid stack.” It is called a bid stack because, in effect, 
the ISO is stacking the bids in order of cost.
Once the bid stack has been made, the ISO starts at the 
bottom and goes up the bid stack until it has purchased 
enough electricity to meet the anticipated load in New 
England for that hour. The last (that is, most expensive) 
generator to be used in a certain hour is called the 
“marginal unit,” and it is the price of this marginal unit 
that sets the clearing price that all generators (that clear) 
will be paid for that hour. 
In this system, generators do not get paid according to 
the price at which they bid their electricity. Instead, 
every generator gets paid the same price for the same 
hour. That price is called the “clearing price” for that 
hour; and the clearing price for each hour is set by the 
last, marginal (most expensive) unit (at the top of the 
bid stack) to be committed by the ISO for that hour in 
order for the ISO to get sufficient electricity to meet the 
anticipated load for that hour.
The ISO will commit (that is, use the electricity from) 
every generator that bid in for that hour at or below the 
clearing price for that hour; the ISO will not commit 
(that is, not use the electricity from) every generator 
CHAPTER 5
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that bid in above the clearing price for that hour. (Thus, 
generators have an economic incentive to keep their 
bids as low as possible, because if they bid in above the 
clearing price, they will not be committed for that hour; 
thus, they will not sell any electricity; and they will 
receive zero dollars for that hour.)
This method of pricing electricity explains the well-
known phenomenon that electricity prices are highest 
on the hottest afternoons of the summer; because 
increased electricity use from air conditioning requires 
the ISO to turn on those last, most expensive genera-
tors, and those most expensive generators are setting 
the clearing price for the entire system.
 This method of pricing electricity also explains why the 
overall clearing price paid by utilities and customers is 
lowered when more low-cost power is bid in; and the 
overall clearing price is raised when more high-cost 
power is bid in: the ISO always starts at the bottom of 
the bid stack, and always goes up the bid stack only as 
far as necessary to meet the load for that hour.
THE PRICE-SUPPRESSION EFFECT OF 
RENEWABLES
Generators generally make their bid offers in accor-
dance with the cost of the fuel that they use to generate 
electricity. For example, usually oil is a more expensive 
fuel from which to generate electricity than natural gas; 
therefore, usually oil-fired generators have to bid in at 
a higher price than gas-fired generators. 
The cost of the “fuel” that renewable resources run on—
say, sunshine, or the wind—is zero. Moreover, some 
renewable energy producers receive compensation 
from places other than the ISO. We discussed one of 
those revenue streams in Chapter 2 (RECs that come 
from state RPS statutes). Another such revenue stream 
can come from federal Production Tax Credits that are 
paid to renewable energy resources.
As a result, many renewable energy projects bid in to 
the New England electricity wholesale energy market 
at zero dollars for every day and every hour that that 
resource is available. Such resources that bid in to the 
Real Time and Day Ahead energy markets run by the 
ISO are called “price takers,” because they will take any 
clearing price that the ISO sets for that hour. (Another 
example of a price-taker in the energy markets is a 
nuclear power plant. Nuclear plants cannot be turned 
on and off for short periods; they always have to be 
either running or off. Thus, nuclear plants generally par-
ticipate in the energy market as price takers. They want 
to make sure they always clear, and they are willing to 
be committed regardless of what the clearing price is 
for a particular hour.) 
Remember: all generators get the clearing price for 
every hour that they are committed, not price that they 
bid in at. Thus, these “price takers” that bid in at zero 
still get the clearing price, whether that clearing price 
is, say, 3¢ per KWh for one hour and then 25¢ per KWh 
for another hour.
The fact that renewable energy projects bid in to the 
ISO’s energy markets at zero means that the clearing 
price for all electricity for all electricity customers in 
New England gets lowered because of the presence of 
renewable energy at the bottom of the “bid stack” (in 
fact, at zero). This lowering of electricity prices paid by 
customers due to the presence of renewable energy on 
the grid (and its presence in the ISO’s bid stack) is called 
the “price-suppression effect” of renewable energy. It 
means renewable energy is reducing the overall price 
of electricity for the region.
The amount of this benefit can be significant. In a recent 
report by a leading international consulting firm, Charles 
River Associates (CRA), on the price-suppression effect 
of the 468 megawatts (MW) of wind power expected 
from the Cape Wind project, CRA estimated the benefit 
to customers to be about $185 million annually, or 
about $4.6 billion over the expected 25-year life of the 
project. While these figures are controversial, and other 
experts put the dollar value of the price-suppression 
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effect of Cape Wind significantly lower, they neverthe-
less show the price-suppression effect of renewable 
energy is real. The CRA report is titled “Analysis of the 
Impact of Cape Wind on New England Energy Prices,” 
and is dated February 8, 2010. (You can see the full text 





On December 3, 2014, the ISO began allowing gener-
ators to bid at negative-15¢ per KWh. Although all gen-
erators are technically allowed to bid into the energy 
market at negative amounts, it is mostly renewable gen-
erators who are financially able to do so, because they 
have revenue from the sale of RECs or tax credits that 
are paid based on them operating. (See Chapter 2 – 
Renewable Portfolio Standards.) When generators bid 
into the energy market at less than zero, those bids are 
called “negative price offers.”
Consider for a moment what “negative-price offers” 
really mean. When a conventional generator (say, a 
plant that is fired by natural gas) makes a positive price 
bid into the energy market (say, 5¢ per KWh), that gen-
erator is, in effect, saying, “I’ll sell my electricity into the 
market if the market will pay me 5¢ per KWh for all the 
electricity I sell.” If that generator clears the market for 
that hour, it will sell electricity and get paid for the elec-
tricity that it sells. When a renewable generator (say a 
wind farm) makes a negative price bid into the energy 
market (say negative-5¢ per KWh) that generator is, in 
effect, saying, “I’ll sell my electricity into the market—
and I’ll give the market 5¢ per KWh for all of my elec-
tricity the market takes.” Remember that the ISO is just 
a clearing house for these transactions; ultimately, 
these payments will flow through the ISO to electricity 
customers.
Negative-price offers are not merely a theoretical pos-
sibility. Real-time electricity prices in New England have 
been negative for several hours every month since this 
new system was introduced on December 3, 2014.
In addition, starting in early 2016, the ISO is implement-
ing a new rule that will allow renewable energy 
resources like wind and small hydro to set clearing 
prices for the first time. (Until then, these renewable 
resources are allowed to bid into the energy markets, 
but not to set the hourly clearing prices.) When that 
happens, negative clearing prices will probably start 
occurring more frequently than they occur now (as 
renewable resources set the New England clearing 
price). When that happens, dirty old fossil-fuel gener-
ators (like oil and natural gas) would be forced to pay 
the ISO money if they want to sell their electricity into 
the market. And, again, the economic benefits will flow 
back directly to customers. 
THE ENERGY-PRICING PARADIGM  
IS CHANGING
Renewable energy has been around for decades. Over 
the past decade, as the public’s awareness of the 
climate change emergency has increased, environmen-
talists have had some success in promoting renewable 
energy. But for as long as there has been renewable 
energy, the overall structure of the argument surround-
ing renewables has been the same: environmentalists 
promote renewable energy because it reduces carbon 
and other dangerous emissions; consumer advocates 
sometimes oppose renewable energy because it costs 
more than conventional energy.
That paradigm is now changing. It won’t change all at 
once. But because of the way the ISO runs the energy 
markets, the general public (including government offi-
cials and, indeed, all electricity customers) will more 
and more see the cost-savings from the price-suppres-
sion benefits of renewable energy. This is happening 
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now when renewable generators bid in to the energy 
markets as price takers, because the price-suppression 
effect of any price-taker in the market is to depress 
hourly clearing prices. And it will happen even more in 
the future as renewables are allowed to set clearing 
prices, including possibly negative clearing prices that 
will affect all generators.
Another thing that will happen is that old, dirty, fos-
sil-fuel generators will start losing market share and 
then they will start losing money. Owners of dirty, old 
fossil fuel plants know these facts only too well; they 
recognize something (correctly) that the general public 
is about to learn: the old paradigm in which renewable 
energy could be plausibly criticized as being too expen-
sive is changing.
In the new paradigm, renewable energy will be not only 
cleaner than conventional electricity, but it will be 
cheaper, too.
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ISO-NE runs the wholesale markets in New England 
that determine how electricity is priced, and what retail 
price is ultimately paid by customers. As we discussed 
in Chapter 3, in addition to the energy market, there is 
a separate market for what is called “capacity.” This 
chapter explains what capacity is.
CAPACITY AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS:  
HOW THEY FIT TOGETHER
Energy is actual electrons running through wires. In 
contrast, “capacity” is the ability to make electricity at a 
specified time. The ISO runs both New England’s elec-
tricity market and New England’s capacity market. 
Although those two markets are related in the sense 
that electricity resources can participate in both (and 
customers pay for both), the two markets are not iden-
tical. The phrase “electricity resources,” here means 
both conventional generators (like gas, coal, and 
nuclear), renewable generators (like wind, solar, and 
small hydro), and energy efficiency.
The capacity market run by the ISO is a three-year 
forward market. It is often referred to as the “Forward 
Capacity Market,” or FCM.
Once a year, ISO holds what it calls a “Forward Capacity 
Auction” (FCA) for a one-year period of time three years 
in the future. The purpose of these FCAs is to ensure 
that there will be an adequate supply of electricity in 
the region to meet the expected need for electricity. 
ISO conducts its annual FCA in February of each year. 
ISO’s ninth FCA (called, appropriately enough, FCA-9) 
was held in February 2015; FCA-8 was conducted in 
February 2014; FCA-7 in February 2013; and so forth.
The capacity market is designed to ensure that there 
will be sufficient electricity supply available in New 
England in the future. In a Forward Capacity Auction, 
electricity resources compete for what is called a 
“Capacity Supply Obligation” (CSO). The specific obli-
gation that resources acquire when they get a “Capacity 
Supply Obligation” is to meet the need for electricity if 
and when they are called on to do so by the ISO during 
the relevant period. Generators that “clear” (bid suc-
cessfully) in one of these auctions acquire a CSO for a 
future period; in FCA-9 (conducted in February 2015), 
the relevant period was June 1, 2018 to May 31, 2019.
Resources that clear in the auction, and get a CSO, will 
receive a stream of income (called “capacity payments”) 
in the future; and they can use that guarantee of future 
revenue to collateralize a loan now—that is, use those 
loan proceeds (now) to build a power plant that can 
produce electricity three years from now when their 
obligation starts.
(Note: In the preceding two paragraphs we use the 
word “resources” and the phrase “electricity resources.” 
This requires a word of explanation. As used here, “elec-
tricity resources” certainly means electricity generators, 
including conventional fossil-fuel-fired generators and 
nuclear generators. The terms also include renewable 
generators like wind farms. And, importantly, 
“resources,” as used here also include energy efficiency 
and demand response, because these resources are 
allowed to participate in the FCM and acquire a CSO. 
See Chapter 7 (for energy efficiency in the capacity 
market) and Chapter 8 (for demand response).)
CHAPTER 6
Capacity
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Thus, in broad terms, the money that goes to genera-
tors from the capacity market can be, and often is, used 
to generate funds to construct electricity generating 
power plants. The money that goes to generators from 
the electricity market is used to run those power plants, 
which is mostly fuel costs.
THE DESCENDING CLOCK
In most auctions (say, selling a Monet painting at an art 
house) prices start low and ascend. This is because auc-
tions generally move in the direction that the auction-
eer wants the bidding to move; in a conventional 
auction, the auctioneer wants the price to end up as 
high as possible, so the auction moves upward (ascend-
ing). With the FCA, the entity conducting the auction 
(ISO-NE) wants the prices to end up low, because the 
ISO wants electricity end-use customers to pay the 
smallest amount of money possible and still buy the 
future capacity that is required to keep the lights on. 
For that reason, the Forward Capacity Auction is run 
“backwards”—the prices start high and descend with 
each successive round. This is sometimes called a 
“descending clock auction.”
This is what happens.
First, the ISO decides how much capacity is needed in 
the auction. The technical term that ISO uses to 
describe what it needs to buy in these FCAs is “Installed 
Capacity Requirement” (ICR). The ICR is the quantity of 
electricity generation (“capacity”) that is needed 
(“requirement”) to meet the expected load (electricity 
usage) during the relevant period. In FCA-9 (conducted 
in February 2015), the ISO set ICR at 34,189 megawatts 
(MW). What this means is that the ISO believed that 
during the year that runs June 1, 2018 to May 31, 2019, 
the peak electricity load in New England would never 
exceed 34,189 MW.
Then the ISO begins the descending clock auction by 
offering much more (about double) the amount of 
money per MW of electricity than it (the ISO) believes 
will be the final clearing price of the auction. This rela-
tively high price draws in many more offers than the 
ISO needs to clear 34,189 MW. So the ISO lowers the 
offering price in the next round of the auction. At the 
new, lower price, fewer generators, offering fewer total 
MWs, bid in; but the total being offered may still exceed 
the ICR of 34,189 MW. So, the ISO goes to another 
round in descending clock auction, lowering the offer-
ing price yet again.
After several rounds, with the ISO offering a lower price 
per MW in each round, the ISO will eventually get down 
to a price where pretty much exactly 34,189 MW will be 
available. That is the clearing price for that auction. The 
ISO has, in effect, lowered the price it is offering for 
capacity sufficient to match the ICR (the amount it 
needs).
Generators that left the auction in earlier rounds will 
not acquire a CSO; conversely, generators that 
remained in the auction until the auction cleared will 
acquire a CSO. As noted above, generators that do 
acquire a CSO will receive capacity payments from the 
ISO starting three years in the future. These capacity 
payments will be separate from (that is, in addition to) 
payments that the generators may receive from the ISO 
by selling electricity. This makes sense. These genera-
tors are being paid two separate streams of income, 
because they are selling two distinct, separate (albeit, 
related) products: generators receive payments for 
selling capacity, and they may receive payments for 
selling electricity. And the ultimate source of the funds 
that the ISO uses to compensate generators for both 
of these commodities is the same: the electricity cus-
tomers of New England.
FCM RE-DESIGN, OR “PAY FOR PERFORMANCE”
During 2013 through 2015, the ISO developed and 
implemented some significant changes to how the FCM 
will work in the future. As with all changes that the ISO 
wants to make to its Market Rules, these changes were 
discussed at length with NEPOOL members, and then 
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submitted to FERC for approval. (See Chapter 3.) The 
changes to the FCM went into effect in FCA-9 (con-
ducted in February 2015) and will apply for the first time 
to the Capacity Commitment Period (CCP) that runs 
from June 1, 2018 through May 31, 2019.
The basic change that the ISO made was to make 
stricter rules for resources that acquire a CSO in an FCA. 
These new, stricter rules apply to all resources that 
acquire a CSO in an FCM. If a resource with a CSO is 
called upon by the ISO to meet demand when that 
electricity is most needed (called a “shortage event” 
because it is a time when the ISO is running short of 
needed electricity), and the resource is not able to meet 
the demand, that resource will have to pay a penalty to 
the ISO. Conversely, generators that do provide elec-
tricity during a shortage event will be entitled to a bonus 
payment. The entire scheme is called “Pay for Perfor-
mance” (PFP) because generators are being paid for 
performing. 
This PFP system is designed to be revenue neutral. That 
is, the ISO will neither make money nor lose money on 
the overall schema. This is because the net bonus pay-
ments to generators that do perform will equal the net 
penalty payments paid into the system by generators 
who do not perform.
The underlying purpose or rationale for the new PFP 
system is to make New England’s electricity system 
more reliable. PFP is designed to make the system more 
reliable by providing economic incentives to generators 
to take steps that may be necessary to ensure that they 
will always be available if called upon by the ISO. For 
example, a gas-fired generator might install an oil tank 
next to the generator so that, if gas is less available 
because it is also being used for home heating, the gen-
erator can switch over to oil and keep producing elec-
tricity, even without gas. (See Chapter 10 – Gas.)
Although this FCM Re-Design (Pay for Performance) is 
new, it is generally believed that the result will be some-
what higher FCA clearing prices, because generators 
will add a risk premium into their FCA bids (to compen-
sate for the risk of penalties). The resulting higher FCA 
clearing prices will be passed along to electricity cus-
tomers. The overall bargain is that customers will pay a 
slightly higher price for capacity; and, in return, they will 
get a more reliable supply of electricity.
A QUICK LOOK AT TWO RECENT AUCTIONS
In FCA-8 (conducted in February 2014), the ISO failed 
to acquire all the capacity it said it needed for the CCP 
that runs from June 1, 2017 to May 31, 2018. The short-
fall, such as it was, was very small. In FCA-8, the ISO’s 
ICR (the amount it wanted to procure) was 33,855 MW; 
the amount of capacity it actually procured was 33,712 
MW, a shortfall of a mere 143 MW.
The reasons for the (very small) shortfall were mostly 
things that environmentalists were pleased about. In the 
period leading up to the auction (FCA-8), several dirty, 
old fossil-fuel and nuclear plants decided to close 
down, partly in response to years of activism by 
environmentalists:
j	 New England “lost” 1,535 MW of capacity when the 
dirty, old Brayton Point coal-fired plant decided to shut 
down by 2017. (CLF worked for years, ultimately suc-
cessfully, to close down Brayton Point.)
j	 New England “lost” 604 MW when the Vermont 
Yankee nuclear plant decided to close. (CLF also worked 
for years to close down Vermont Yankee.) 
j	 New England also “lost” another 342 MW when the 
very dirty old oil-fired Norwalk Harbor Station decided 
to close.
Each one of these retirements was a good thing.
Even though the auction shortfall in FCA-8 was insig-
nificant, it created a lot of very scary press coverage. 
One ISO press release on the auction results was 
headed, in part: “Shortfall in Power System Resources 
Needed for 2017–2018 in New England.” The sub-title 
was: “Resource shortage pushes up capacity market 
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costs.” Another ISO press release said: “The auction 
concluded short of the capacity required, resulting in 
higher prices for capacity for 2017–2018 . . . Before the 
auction was conducted, resources totaling about 3,135 
MW announced plans to retire, resulting in an insuffi-
cient level of resources in the auction . . .”
Scary headlines and scary broadcast news stories fol-
lowed. Many politicians were talking about a supposed 
“crisis” that was looming. Some politicians and others 
believed that building new gas pipelines into New 
England was necessary to address the purported “crisis.”
In February 2015, the ISO conducted FCA-9, in which 
the ICR was 34,189 MW. In fact, in FCA-9, the ISO actu-
ally cleared 34,695 MW of capacity—that is, 506 MW 
more than the ICR.
Where a year earlier, the post-auction press narrative 
was all about shortages and the need for more fossil 
fuels, after FCA-9 the narrative was all about how well 
the market is working. The headline on the ISO’s press 
release in 2015 was: “Annual Forward Capacity Market 
Auction Acquires Major New Generation Resources for 
2018–2019.” The press release actually said:
“The capacity market is working as designed. The price 
signals from last year’s auction helped spur investment 
in new resources, including more than 1,000 MW of 
new generating capacity, which will help . . . meet peak 
demand in 2018–1019,” according to Gordon van 
Welie, president and CEO of ISO New England . . .
ISO President Gordon van Welie was entirely correct 
about that. The capacity market is working the way it 
was meant to work. It is creating the right incentives to 
ensure that there is sufficient generation capacity in 
New England. In fact, as the ISO press release correctly 
stated, the ISO’s capacity market re-design was largely 
responsible for the favorable result in FCA-9.
The results on February 2, 2015, of FCA-9 do not, alone, 
prove that environmentalists (including CLF) were 
correct in 2014 to oppose the earlier proposal for new 
gas pipelines—but the result does provide useful evi-
dence of that fact.
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Energy efficiency allows for lowering energy use while 
providing the same level of service. 
One clear example of energy efficiency in operation is 
replacing older, incandescent light bulbs with newer, 
LED light bulbs. These light bulbs provide the same 
amount of light (lumens) while using about 90% less 
electricity when compared with a standard incandes-
cent light bulb. 
Energy efficiency provides a customer benefit because 
it provides the user with the same service at a lower 
cost. It also provides an environmental benefit because 
it lowers carbon emissions significantly.
The first, and most obvious, savings (in both cost and 
carbon emissions) results from the customer buying 
less electricity. This is an immediate savings that shows 
on the customer’s next electricity bill. 
A second, perhaps less obvious, savings comes from 
energy efficiency lowering the overall electricity 
systems’ costs for everyone. Our electricity system is 
built to accommodate the highest load, which occurs 
only a few hours per year. Expensive, new power plants 
(costing billions of dollars) and expensive new trans-
mission projects (costing additional billions of dollars) 
are added to the electricity grid just to cover that peak 
load for a few hours each year. By reducing peak load, 
energy efficiency saves billions of dollars on the overall 
electricity grid by delaying or avoiding the need for new 
power plants and new transmission lines. (This process 
of reducing peak load is sometimes referred to as 
“peak-shaving.”) Additionally, increased energy effi-
ciency reduces the amount of power that needs to be 
generated from electricity plants. This reduces for 
everyone the pollution and system costs of electricity. 
In this way, energy efficiency saves money for all elec-
tricity customers, including those who did not install 
energy efficiency measures themselves. 
By way of example, the energy efficiency investments 
in Vermont alone have deferred building over $279 
million dollars of new electricity transmission lines over 
the next decade. The total savings in Vermont for 
energy efficiency since 2000 is 12.7 million mega-
watt-hours (MWh). That is equal to the amount of 
energy that would be produced by thirty-two 50 MW 
power plants operating all the time for a year, and is 
enough energy to power every home in Vermont for 
over 5 years. And, for the reasons mentioned above, 
these saving accrued to all Vermont customers, not 
only those who install energy efficiency measures for 
their own use. 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS
All New England states have programs to support 
investments in energy efficiency. The foundation of 
these programs is based on the collective investments 
in energy efficiency lowering the overall cost of elec-
tricity for everyone. As a power resource, energy effi-
ciency is the cleanest and lowest cost resource 
available. Energy efficiency can be acquired for about 
3–4 cents per kilowatt-hour (KWh), while purchasing 
power supply to meet those same needs costs about 
8–10 cents per KWh. 
In all New England states, energy efficiency investments 
are funded in part from a small “System Benefit Charge” 
(SBC). This is a per KWh charge on electricity that is 
used. The exact amount is established by each state 
either by legislation or by a regulatory proceeding. In 
most New England states, the funding level is set to 
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acquire the efficiency resources that cost less than 
other available power supply options. 
Energy efficiency services are provided by utility com-
panies in some states (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
and Rhode Island) and by a separate entity in other 
states (Vermont and Maine). Each state also has some 
independent energy efficiency service providers that 
provide efficiency services based on contracts with 
customers. 
As shown in the next two sections, energy efficiency 
participates in both New England’s capacity market and 
New England’s energy markets. 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE CAPACITY MARKET
The New England electricity grid is run by the ISO-NE 
(see Chapter 3); and the ISO does regional planning to 
ensure the region’s future energy needs will be satisfied 
with the Forward Capacity Market (FCM) (see Chapter 
6). Energy efficiency resources participate in the 
Forward Capacity Auctions, and are able to compete 
on a level playing field with supply resources (such as 
fossil-fuel generators) to meet the region’s power 
needs. Efficiency resources can and do bid into the 
FCM, just as generation sources can. Efficiency 
resources are then paid for their ability to reduce the 
need for electricity and reduce the capacity that would 
otherwise require a generating plant to be available. 
Since efficiency resources can meet capacity needs at 
a much lower cost than generation resources, the par-
ticipation of efficiency in the FCM lowers costs for all 
New England customers. About 80% of all energy effi-
ciency programs in New England clear in the Forward 
Capacity Market. The revenue streams that result from 
these auctions are a significant source of funds for 
advancing energy efficiency in New England (but there 
are also other significant sources of revenue for effi-
ciency programs, including the state-mandated SBCs).
The most recent FCM auction (FCA-9, in February 2015; 
see Chapter 6) drew 367 MW of new energy efficiency 
resources (that reduce overall demand for electricity). 
The total energy efficiency that clears in the annual 
Forward Capacity Auction is now about 1,500 MW. 
Because the ISO is responsible for the reliability of New 
England’s electricity grid, the ISO sets rigorous stan-
dards, with checks and verification, on energy efficiency 
resources that bid into the FCM. Just as the ISO has a 
strict qualification process that must be followed by 
generators that participate in the FCM, there is also a 
strict qualification process that must be followed by 
efficiency providers.
ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE ENERGY MARKET
Energy efficiency also participates in New England’s 
energy markets. In Chapter 5 we looked at how elec-
tricity prices are set in the ISO-run Real Time and Day 
Ahead energy markets by the creation of a bid stack. 
When energy efficiency is present on the electricity 
grid—as a result of the programs described above—
energy demand is lower than it would otherwise be for 
every hour of the year. This means the wholesale clear-
ing price for electricity will also be lower for many hours 
of the year (but can never be higher) than they would 
otherwise be (without energy efficiency).
There is a fancy acronym for this: DRIPE. DRIPE stands 
for “Demand Reduction Induced Price Effects.” For 
some hours of the year, DRIPE represents a relatively 
small savings for electricity customers. However, during 
times of peak load, when electricity prices are highest, 
DRIPE represents much larger savings for customers.
ISO PLANNING SHOWS THE EFFECTS OF 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
In Chapter 3, we saw that one of the three principal 
functions of the ISO-NE is that it prepares forecasts on 
future energy needs and resources. For energy effi-
ciency, ISO-NE has forecasted that the region expects 
about 1,616 gigawatt-hours (GWh) of energy savings 
annually from 2018 to 2024 and that the reduction in 
peak demand would be about 212 MW annually over 
the forecast period. 
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Similar to the individual customer savings for energy 
efficiency, the demand forecast lowers the overall 
amount of supply that is needed and that customers 
must pay for. The fact that the region is meeting 
growing demand for energy as a result of increased 
gadgets and other energy uses, while maintaining a flat, 
and now declining need for supply resources, positions 
New England well to meet the challenges of increased 
electrification of transportation and other uses while 
maintaining lower costs. 
The two charts to the right, produced by ISO-NE’s 
Energy Efficiency Forecast Working Group, illustrate the 
twin benefits (lowered carbon emissions and cost 
savings) of energy efficiency. 
The chart on the top right reflects the amount of elec-
tricity that the ISO anticipates will be used in New 
England each year between now and 2024 (in GWh). 
The top (orange) line shows the anticipated growth of 
overall electricity use without energy efficiency pro-
grams; the bottom, much lower (blue) line shows antic-
ipated load growth (or decline) over the same period 
with energy efficiency programs. The difference 
between the orange and blue lines represents avoided 
electricity generation due to energy efficiency. Much 
of that avoided electricity generation would have been 
from fossil fuels; thus, this avoided generation yields 
important environmental benefits, including lowered 
emissions of carbon and other pollutants. These emis-
sion reductions are both measurable and significant. To 
take a single example, the electricity energy efficiency 
in Vermont cut polluting greenhouse gas emissions by 
8.7 million metric tons since 2000. That is equivalent to 
reducing pollution by taking 1.8 million cars off the road 
for one year.
The chart on the bottom right shows the anticipated 
effect of energy efficiency programs on peak load for 
each year between now and 2024. Again, the top 
(orange) line shows anticipated increase in peak load 
without energy efficiency programs; the much lower 
(blue) line shows anticipated load growth with energy 
efficiency programs. The difference between the two 
lines represents the demand that would otherwise need 
to be met with expensive investments in the overall 
electricity system (including power plants and transmis-
sion lines) that can be avoided because of energy effi-
ciency programs. To take but a single example, the 
savings from the region’s investments in energy effi-
ciency resulted in about $420 million in transmission 
upgrades that were deferred for New England custom-
ers. The region required fewer transmission upgrades 
as a result of lower energy use. Since transmission costs 
are now some of the highest and fastest growing costs 
on customers’ electricity bills, these savings provide real 
and long-term benefits. The pecuniary benefits of these 
avoided grid-build-out expenses accrue to every cus-
tomer, including those who did not themselves install 
energy efficiency measures.
Source: ISO-NE’s Energy Efficiency Forecast Working Group
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WHAT IS “DEMAND RESPONSE”?
Demand Response (DR) refers to electricity customers 
reducing their consumption of electricity from the grid 
at times of peak demand. As an alternative to produc-
tion of additional electricity (say by fossil fuel power 
plants), DR has two big advantages. First, DR produces 
no carbon (or other emissions), so DR is environmen-
tally preferable. Second, DR saves customers money, 
so DR is economically sensible as well.
Electricity demand varies considerably over different 
seasons of the year and over different hours of the day. 
In New England, demand typically peaks around mid- 
to late afternoon on the very hottest days of the year, 
when air conditioner use is highest. Most days of the 
year, New England needs no more than about 20,000 
megawatts (MW) of electricity to meet the needs of all 
electricity customers. But on those hottest days, peak 
demand can spike to about 28,000 MW (that is, 40% 
more than usual).
This is important because we need enough power 
plants and transmission lines to accommodate that 
peak load, even though it only occurs a few hours every 
year. The power plants needed on peak days are both 
polluting and expensive. This extra capacity is polluting 
because these so-called “peaking” power plants (that 
are only turned on during times of peak demand) are 
the dirtiest, most polluting fossil fuel power plants on 
the system. In New England, the plants serving this role 
are powered by oil or even jet fuel, which are also much 
more expensive than other power plant fuels and “free-
fuel” renewable energy like wind and solar.4 
DR seeks to lower the cost of electricity and decrease 
pollution from peaking power plants by reducing elec-
tricity load when demand reaches unusually high levels. 
This can be done in many ways. For example, an indi-
vidual factory can move a shift of workers from daytime 
hours to nighttime hours so that its machines will not 
be running during the day, when electricity demand is 
highest. Companies can install technology that auto-
matically adjusts air conditioners at, say, a chain of 500 
grocery stores (or drug stores or shopping malls) upward 
from, say, 69 degrees to, say, 73 degrees, so that those 
stores use less electricity. DR can be controlled through 
technology so that it can be dispatched, like a power 
plant, in real-time (so-called “active” DR) or less directly 
by local actions to turn off equipment or reduce demand 
(so-called “passive” DR). So far, DR is most common in 
the commercial and industrial sector; in the future, with 
Internet-connected appliances and smart electric 
meters that allow two-way communication between 
the grid operator and households, residential customers 
will also be able to be DR providers.
A growing sector of DR companies aggregate users 
making DR commitments and sell those commitments 
to an ISO for compensation as an energy resource; this 
compensation is then shared between the DR aggre-
gator and the electricity customers reducing their 
demand. These electricity customers thus benefit finan-
cially in two separate, direct ways: (1) the compensation 
they receive for reducing their demand; and (2) the 
savings they realize from reducing their energy costs at 
peak times. These savings can be especially significant 
for large businesses that buy wholesale electricity or 
pay variable electricity rates.
CHAPTER 8
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4 Keep in mind that these peaking generators may receive two separate streams of income (see Chapter 6: Capacity). First, peaking gen-
erators do receive capacity payments if they clear in a capacity auction and are available to be turned on by the ISO. Second, peaking 
generators may receive energy payments if they actually are turned on by the ISO (during period of peak demand).
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When hundreds (or thousands) of separate electricity 
users all participate in DR programs like these, electric-
ity demand during peak hours can be significantly 
reduced. DR reduces costs to all electricity customers 
because it offsets the power that would be generated 
by expensive peaking power plants that would be 
running without DR. Because customers pay a blended 
average of the cost of producing all electricity, using 
DR to “shave the peak” is an extremely cost-effective 
way to lower those averages. DR also reduces costs to 
all electricity customers by eliminating the need to build 
expensive infrastructure (like power plants and trans-
mission lines), which is only used a few hours or days 
per year.
(Note that the environmental and economic benefits of 
DR are less impressive if participating customers reduce 
their electricity load on the grid but then operate their 
own fossil fuel, typically diesel-powered, generators to 
continue operating as usual. Because they are subject 
to less stringent environmental requirements than 
larger power plants, these generators can be more pol-
luting than even peaking power plants.) 
HOW SIGNIFICANT IS DR?
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
recently published a report that looks at the role and 
impact of DR in the context of the nation’s overall elec-
tricity grid. (You can see the full FERC report, here: 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/
demand-response/dem-res-adv-metering.asp ) 
The MW figures that FERC presents are impressive. Here 
in New England, the ISO can get 2,769 MW of DR, which 
works out to 10.7% of New England’s peak demand. The 
California ISO has 2,430 MW of DR. PJM has a whop-
ping 8,781 MW of DR. Nationally, there are 28,503 MW 
of DR on the U.S. electricity grid. (By way of compari-
son, this is significantly more than the normal, everyday 
electricity consumption of all homes and businesses in 
all of the six New England states combined.) FERC con-
cludes that DR is “a quantifiable, reliable resource for 
regional [electricity] planning purposes.”
The dollar figures that this involves are also impressive. 
For example, the presence of DR in one recent year cut 
the capacity clearing price by about 50% in the PJM 
area. (For a discussion of the role of capacity, see 
Chapter 6. Recall that “PJM” is the ISO that runs the 
electricity grid for all or parts of 13 states, including 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland; see Chapter 
3.) In other words, if DR were not in the electricity 
markets, there would be an added expense to electricity 
customers in the PJM area of over nine billion dollars—
in just a single year, and in just one part of the country! 
Like energy efficiency resources (see Chapter 7), DR 
resources are permitted to participate in the ISO-run 
Forward Capacity Market (FCM) (see Chapter 6). And, 
as with energy efficiency, the ISO has a strict qualifica-
tion process that must be followed by DR providers 
before they are allowed to participate in the FCM.
FERC REGULATES DEMAND RESPONSE
Under the Federal Power Act (FPA), FERC has authority 
to regulate all interstate sales of electricity and the 
interstate wholesale electricity markets. The FPA also 
gives FERC power to regulate everything “affecting” 
those electricity markets, and the power to ensure that 
wholesale rates are “just and reasonable.”
Over the years, FERC has issued a number of Orders 
concerning DR. In 2008, FERC issued Order 719, which 
required ISOs (including ISO-NE) to incorporate DR into 
their wholesale markets. However, Order 719 also left 
it to ISOs to determine how much to pay for DR.
In March 2011, FERC Issued its Order 745; the reader 
can see the full text of Order 745 on the FERC website, 
here: http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20110
315105757-RM10-17-000.pdf. Order 745 instructed all 
ISOs to pay a certain price for DR. FERC set the price 
fairly high, because FERC wanted to create an eco-
nomic incentive for DR to participate in wholesale elec-
tricity markets. Specifically, FERC ordered ISOs to pay 
what is called the “Locational Marginal Price” (LMP) for 
DR; LMP is the same spot market price that the same 
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ISO pays for electricity at the same location and at the 
same time. (And, as we discussed above, the price that 
an ISO pays for electricity varies from time to time.)
FERC’s Order 745 was controversial. By creating strong 
economic incentives for DR to enter the market, cus-
tomers stood to save literally (not figuratively) billions 
of dollars. If DR had not been in the market, customers 
would unnecessarily have had to pay much more for 
electricity. A group of generators, the Electric Power 
Supply Association (EPSA), sued FERC, saying that FERC 
had no legal authority (jurisdiction) to issue Order 745. 
The Circuit Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C. issued 
a ruling in favor of EPSA in May 2014, and FERC’s appeal 
to the United States Supreme Court is currently pending. 
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ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION
The electricity transmission system is the vast network 
of poles and wires that carries electric power from 
power plants to homes and businesses. In essence, the 
transmission system is a complex machine that bal-
ances electricity supply and demand in real time. The 
transmission system is often divided into two systems: 
j	 the high-voltage “bulk power” transmission system 
that carries large amounts of power over long distances 
and often across state lines; and
j	 the local “distribution” system that connects to the 
high-voltage transmission grid and brings power to 
electricity “end-users” (customers). 
This chapter addresses three things: (1) how the trans-
mission system has been traditionally operated and 
funded; (2) how the transmission system is planned and 
regulated to ensure electricity reliability; and (3) how 
the transmission system is changing as public policy 
increasingly drives the deployment of cleaner and dis-
tributed energy resources.
TRADITIONAL TRANSMISSION DEVELOPMENT
Electricity utilities are principally responsible for build-
ing and owning transmission facilities. Under the Federal 
Power Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) regulates most interstate transmission facilities 
and the utilities that own them. Local distribution 
systems and the utilities that own and operate them are 
regulated by state utility commissions under state law. 
(See Chapter 1.) In both cases, utilities have traditionally 
been granted exclusive franchises to provide transmis-
sion services within a geographic territory. 
Investor-owned utilities (referred to as IOUs) recover 
the costs of developing and operating transmission 
facilities as well as a reasonable return on their invest-
ments through charges approved by regulators and 
payable by electricity customers. In many cases, power 
plant owners pay for the transmission facilities that are 
necessary to connect their generating units with the 
electricity grid in such a way that there is no resulting 
adverse effect on the rest of the system.
Historically, transmission development has anticipated 
and followed growth in electricity demand, as utilities 
added new customers and new service territories and 
customer energy needs increased. Utilities, under reg-
ulatory oversight, planned new investments in trans-
mission facilities based on their forecasts of electricity 
demand and system conditions. In some cases, neigh-
boring utilities partnered to develop major transmission 
upgrades. In several regions of the country, transmis-
sion system planning has been assumed by regional 
transmission organizations, which are discussed below.
Over the last century, the overriding goal of transmis-
sion planning and development has been to ensure 
system reliability (“to keep the lights on”) at a reasonable 
cost but in virtually all circumstances, including times 
of high electricity demand, power plant or transmission 
facility outages, and extreme weather conditions. Fol-
lowing a major blackout during the summer of 2003 
that affected much of the eastern United States, Con-
gress charged FERC with establishing national reliability 
standards for the country’s transmission system. FERC 
has designated the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC), a non-profit corporation, as the 
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entity with the responsibility for developing and admin-
istering reliability standards. These standards now 
consist of nearly 3,000 pages of rules and protocols for 
operating and planning transmission systems, including 
system performance requirements, communication 
protocols, security measures, and contingency plans 
for emergencies. Continuous compliance with these 
standards can require the development of new trans-
mission lines and upgrades to transmission 
equipment.
REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS
In several regions of the United States, the operation 
and planning of the transmission system has shifted 
away from individual utilities to Regional Transmission 
Organizations, or RTOs. RTOs are independent non-
profit corporations that administer the power grid under 
the regulatory oversight of FERC and with the cooper-
ation of the region’s electricity utilities, which continue 
to own and develop transmission facilities. The power 
industry was encouraged to establish RTOs by FERC 
Order 888 in 1996, which required utilities to offer 
non-discriminatory access to transmission facilities. 
The shift to RTOs closely followed the restructuring of 
the electricity industry in the 1990s, which introduced 
competition into the market for power generation in 
some states by separating the transmission and power 
plant businesses of electricity utilities. 
The nation’s RTOs include ISO-New England, the Mid-
continent Independent System Operator (MISO), PJM 
Interconnection LLC (PJM), and the Southwest Power 
Pool. The New York Independent System Operator and 
California Independent System Operator have many of 
the roles and characteristics of an RTO, but their terri-
tories are limited to their states. Some regions of the 
country, including much of the South and the Mountain 
West, have not restructured the electricity industry and 
do not have RTOs; the electricity utilities in those 
regions are individually responsible for planning and 
operating the transmission system within their territo-
ries and are directly regulated by FERC. The transmis-
sion system for much of Texas is electrically isolated 
from the rest of the United States and is administered 
by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, an entity 
similar to an RTO but outside FERC jurisdiction.
RTOs control the operation of the electricity grid 
around the clock to ensure that electricity supply and 
demand are balanced across a region. As part of their 
planning function, RTOs work with electricity utilities 
and other stakeholders to identify transmission system 
needs and to approve new transmission projects. With 
input from these stakeholders, RTOs also draft and 
revise transmission market rules and regional tariffs for 
transmission facilities and services, which are reviewed 
and approved by FERC. Electricity utilities collect the 
transmission charges authorized by RTO tariffs from 
electricity customers, and those funds are in turn paid 
to the electricity utilities that own and build transmis-
sion facilities in the region.
(Note: As used here, the word “tariff” has a specific legal 
meaning. A tariff is a schedule listing the rates charged 
by a public utility (see Chapter 1) for a public service 
(like a trip on a ferry) or a commodity (like electricity or 
gas). Typically, tariffs have to be approved by a federal 
regulator (such as FERC) or a state regulator (such as a 
utilities commission) before they can go into effect. 
Once it goes into effect, the tariff is available to all cus-
tomers. Electricity tariffs also typically include certain 
terms and conditions of sale, and these terms and con-
ditions are also subject to regulatory approval.) 
In addition to managing the transmission system, RTOs 
administer wholesale energy and other electricity 
system markets under FERC oversight. RTOs also work 
together to manage the flow of power between neigh-
boring regions, most of which have numerous trans-
mission connections, and to engage in interregional 
planning.
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TRANSMISSION FOR CLEAN AND  
DISTRIBUTED ENERGY
Utilities and RTOs are just beginning to adapt to the 
rapid growth of clean and distributed energy resources, 
which are often encouraged by federal and state public 
policies. These resources have important differences 
from the conventional power plants around which our 
transmission system originally developed. In the case 
of solar power, for example, solar generation can be 
located at any customer’s home or business and both 
reduces the customer’s need for power from conven-
tional power plants and also sends power back into the 
electricity grid during the sunniest hours of the day. In 
the case of wind power, wind farms may be located in 
rural areas where the wind resource is greatest but the 
transmission system is less developed. With either solar 
or wind, the output of the resource is dependent on 
weather; while transmission system operators can use 
weather forecasts to anticipate their output, they are 
not necessarily available “on-demand” like conventional 
power plants.
In 2011, FERC issued Order 1000, which requires a 
greater degree of regional transmission system plan-
ning and coordination by RTOs and utilities, including 
the consideration of public policies, such as state 
Renewable Portfolio Standard laws (see Chapter 2) and 
federal environmental regulations. Order 1000 is one 
step toward adapting the transmission system to 
address both its traditional objective of electricity reli-
ability and also the need for and unique characteristics 
of new clean energy resources. 
Order 1000 also calls for RTOs and utilities to develop 
ways to allocate the costs of transmission upgrades that 
may be necessary for public policies to be achieved, 
such as new transmission lines to connect renewable 
resources in rural areas with electricity customers 
in urban areas. The allocation of costs for the devel-
opment of transmission has long been a point of 
controversy in New England and other RTO regions and 
has been a limiting factor in the development of 
transmission to serve renewable energy. Within the 
ISO-NE region, the cost of building transmission that is 
designed to serve a regional reliability function, even 
though located entirely within one state, is paid for by 
the customers of all New England states through a 
regional charge on electricity bills. In that instance, the 
customers in each state pay a percentage of the cost 
of the project that is calculated based upon that state’s 
percentage of the overall “load” or demand for electric-
ity within the ISO-NE region. 
Transmission projects that do not serve a regional reli-
ability function, including those designed to deliver 
renewable energy to specific markets, must be paid by 
the customers within the territory served by that trans-
mission. This difference in cost allocation methods has 
served as a disincentive to develop lines that serve 
renewables and an incentive for utilities to build reli-
ability oriented projects. With Order 1000, FERC hopes 
to create mechanisms that will promote more renew-
able energy-related transmission. In recent years, FERC 
also has approved and encouraged “merchant” trans-
mission lines that are developed and financed by com-
panies other than incumbent electricity utilities; in some 
cases, these merchant transmission lines are intended 
to help meet state public policy objectives. 
There is a growing recognition that renewable energy 
resources, energy efficiency, and advanced energy 
storage may help reduce the need for costly new trans-
mission system upgrades by reducing electricity 
demand growth and shaving the peak energy needs 
during the days and hours of highest demand. (For 
additional discussion on “peak shaving,” see Chapter 5 
– Electricity Prices, and Chapter 7 – Energy Efficiency.) 
Although utilities and RTOs have been slow to recog-
nize the transmission system benefits of these resources, 
they are beginning to incorporate the growth in clean 
energy and efficiency measures into transmission 
planning.
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In New England, natural gas fired power plants are the 
predominant form of electricity generating capacity 
interconnected with the ISO-NE grid, representing over 
50% of the total. This shift to gas dominated capacity 
occurred over the last 10–15 years as older coal, oil, 
and nuclear generation facilities in New England suc-
cumbed to economic and regulatory pressures, and 
were replaced by facilities powered by natural gas and 
a modest amount of renewable sources of energy. (See 
Chapter 4.) Natural gas plants require smaller parcels 
of land than coal and nuclear plants, and are cheaper 
and easier to build. Additionally, in 2008 the wholesale 
price of natural gas dropped significantly due in part to 
increased natural gas extraction from the Marcellus 
shale formation in the Appalachian region of the U.S. 
The status of natural gas as the cheapest fossil fuel 
accelerated the growth of the fuel’s proportional role 
in the New England energy mix. 
The displacement of coal and oil facilities with natural 
gas may have had a net positive effect on greenhouse 
gas emissions in New England in the early 2000s, as the 
greenhouse gas emissions from a natural gas burning 
power plant are lower than those from a coal or oil 
burning power plant. In recent years, however, more 
renewable energy (including, but not limited to, wind 
and solar) has become operational in New England; at 
the same time, many older, dirtier power plants, includ-
ing ones that ran on the two dirtiest fuels, coal and oil, 
have closed. As a result of these changes, overall carbon 
emissions from electricity generation in New England 
have declined so much that the carbon-emission profile 
of a new gas-fired electricity generator is actually higher 
than the regional average for all electricity generation. 
That is, on a system-wide level, increased natural gas 
generation is no longer a net positive for the climate. 
Further increases in the percentage of system-wide 
natural gas capacity also tie New England closer to the 
risks of price volatility in the natural gas market. 
WHY THE PRESSURE FOR MORE PIPELINE?
To understand the reasoning cited by proponents of 
new natural gas pipelines in New England, we must first 
explore the historical role of natural gas and the current 
dual role it plays in New England during the winter 
months. 
New England’s natural gas pipeline infrastructure was 
originally built-out in order to serve residential, com-
mercial and industrial gas heating (or thermal) and pro-
duction customers. The system of pipes is comprised 
of large interstate pipelines that transmit gas long dis-
tances from wellheads to a system of distribution pipe-
lines that deliver the gas to customers. The distribution 
pipelines are owned by gas Local Distribution Compa-
nies (LDCs) that contract with the interstate pipeline to 
purchase capacity on the interstate pipeline. Interstate 
pipelines are regulated by the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission (FERC) pursuant to the federal Natural 
Gas Act. LDCs and their distribution pipeline network 
are regulated by state public utility commissions, which 
must approve of both the construction of pipelines and 
the long term contracts by which the LDCs purchase 
the gas that they distribute to customers. 
Natural gas electricity generators get their natural gas 
fuel from this same system of interstate and local dis-
tribution pipelines. With the increase in natural gas gen-
eration in recent years, overall natural gas consumption 
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has increased and put pressures on supplies. The use 
of natural gas in residential and commercial and indus-
trial heating (thermal use) has been rising along with 
use of natural gas for electricity generation. As gas 
prices generally remained low since 2008, homes and 
businesses (particularly in southern New England) have 
been converting from fuel oil heating to natural gas. 
Local distribution companies for thermal gas have their 
rates set by their state public utility commissions, and 
are allowed to recover from customers the cost of fixed 
contracts with interstate gas suppliers for natural gas 
capacity. In contrast, the market rules established by 
ISO-NE for electricity generators do not provide any 
economic incentive for those generators to make long-
term contracts for what is referred to as “firm gas” (gas 
deliveries that are guaranteed). Instead, electricity gen-
erators depend on buying gas on the daily “spot market.” 
Spot market prices are a complicated function of 
supply, demand, and other market mechanics. 
During peak hours of several of the coldest days during 
the winter of 2013–2014, thermal (for home heating) 
and electric (for gas-fired electricity generators) 
demand for natural gas capacity combined with ineffi-
ciencies between the natural gas and electricity whole-
sale markets to cause significant but short-lived “needle” 
spikes in the price of natural gas. These gas price spikes 
caused the price of natural gas powered electricity to 
increase. This resulted in coal and oil electricity gener-
ation being more cost effective relative to the market 
than usual, and those resources wound up running 
more during discrete periods of the winter. 
However, the situation was quite different during the 
following winter. The winter of 2014–2015 was signifi-
cantly colder than the previous winter of 2013–2014. 
But several market forces operated to keep electricity 
prices significantly lower during winter 2014–2015 than 
they had been the previous winter. For example, 
changes made to market rules by ISO-NE created eco-
nomic incentives for electricity generators to stockpile 
fuel oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) (and this, in turn, 
reduced their reliance on pipeline gas). Also, wholesale 
prices for oil and LNG were lower in 2014–2015 than 
they had been the previous winter. These factors com-
bined to prevent the severe needle spikes in the price 
of natural gas that had been seen during the winter of 
2013–2014. Unfortunately, in several states winter elec-
tricity rates were set in the fall of 2014 based on whole-
sale price forecasts that feared a repeat of the previous 
winter’s needle spikes, resulting in a 30% increase in 
electricity rates for much of New England. 
Despite the fact that true capacity constraints due to 
the confluence of electricity and thermal gas demand 
were very limited, interstate gas pipeline companies and 
electricity companies have used the experience of the 
2013–2014 winter (and the resulting high electricity 
rates of the 2014–2015 winter) to argue that New 
England needs a significant increase in natural gas pipe-
line capacity. The anticipated retirement of old, dirty 
and economically obsolete power plants over the next 
several years had added to this expressed concern for 
natural gas supplies.
WHY THE OPPOSITION TO NEW GAS PIPELINE?
The overall opposition to new natural gas pipelines in 
New England is multifaceted and stems from a number 
of different motivations. Some people oppose increased 
natural gas infrastructure in any form, some oppose 
brand new natural gas pipelines but not the expansion 
of existing pipelines, and some oppose public policy 
action at the state or regional level to incentivize new 
natural gas pipeline infrastructure. 
The motivation for opposition to new pipelines is gen-
erally grounded in environmental and public health 
concerns, economic concerns, or both. Relevant envi-
ronmental concerns include: the effects on land and 
water of pipeline construction and maintenance; the 
effects of natural gas production at the source, partic-
ularly the hydraulic fracturing method of gas extraction 
used in the Marcellus region of the U.S.; air pollution 
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effects of compressor stations placed along pipelines 
and from natural gas plants; and greenhouse gas emis-
sions at every point of the natural gas extraction, trans-
mission, distribution, and end use system. Accompanying 
health concerns include air pollution impacts from 
pipelines, compressor stations, and natural gas plants, 
as well as pipeline safety risks. 
Economic opposition to natural gas pipelines is based 
upon the effect that increased natural gas capacity in 
New England would have on electricity markets and on 
other types of generation. These concerns are most 
prevalent with respect to proposed state or regional 
public policy incentives for increased natural gas trans-
mission capacity. If states intervene in the natural gas 
market dynamics to artificially inflate the demand for 
natural gas using customers’ money, it will have the 
effect of depressing wholesale electricity prices and 
reducing the market signals sent to other types of gen-
eration. In particular, there is concern about signifi-
cantly expanding natural gas capacity where current 
natural gas market limitations only occur on a handful 
of days during the year. Existing market generators are 
invested in the current energy market and are con-
cerned that this privileges natural gas above other forms 
of energy. Environmental advocates and customer 
advocates with long-term views of energy costs are 
concerned that this will result in decreased market 
incentives for sources of energy with lower greenhouse 
gas emissions like wind and solar. 
WHAT ARE THE EXISTING GAS PIPELINES IN 
NEW ENGLAND?
New England is served by several major existing natural 
gas pipelines. 
j	 The Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company crosses 
southern Massachusetts from upstate New York 
and extends through the Boston area into New 
Hampshire. 
j	 The Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. line travels 
through Connecticut and Rhode Island to Boston. 
j	 The Portland Natural Gas Transmission System 
(PNGTS) crosses northern New Hampshire from 
Quebec to Portland, Maine. 
j	 The Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline travels south-
westerly from New Brunswick through Maine to 
northeastern Massachusetts. 
j	 The Granite State Gas Transmission line travels 
from Portland, Maine to northeastern 
Massachusetts.
j The Iroquois Gas Transmission System crosses 
southwestern Connecticut. 
Figure 6 on page 38 depicts the current gas pipelines 
into New England.
WHAT ARE THE PROPOSED GAS PIPELINES  
IN NEW ENGLAND? AT WHAT STAGE OF  
REGULATORY APPROVAL IS EACH PROPOSED 
GAS PIPELINE?
Multiple gas pipeline expansion projects are currently 
proposed for New England. 
j	 The Algonquin Incremental Market (AIM) project 
from Algonquin Gas Transmission/Spectra Energy is a 
proposed incremental upgrade to the existing Algon-
quin Gas Transmission Co. line. 
— The AIM project was approved by FERC in March of 
2015 and is planned to be in service in the second 
half of 2016. 
j	 The Connecticut Expansion project from Tennessee 
Gas is a proposed looping project from the current Ten-
nessee Gas Pipeline Company line in Connecticut and 
Massachusetts. 
— The Connecticut Expansion project is being consid-
ered formally by FERC.
j	 The Continent to Coast (C2C) Expansion is a pro-
posed incremental expansion of the existing Portland 
Natural Gas Transmission System line. 
— The C2C project is in contract negotiations. 
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j	 The Atlantic Bridge project from Spectra Energy is a 
proposed incremental expansion of the existing Algon-
quin and Maritimes & Northeast lines. 
— The Atlantic Bridge project is in the pre-filing stage 
at FERC.
j	 The Northeast Energy Direct (NED) Project is a pro-
posed new pipeline expansion by Tennessee Gas 
Company that would travel across northern MA and 
southern NH to Dracut, MA. 
— The NED Project is in the pre-filing stage at FERC.
j	 The Access Northeast project is a proposed 
“enhancement” of the Algonquin and Maritimes & 
Northeast pipeline systems. This project is a joint 
venture by Spectra Energy and the electricity and gas 
utilities Eversource Energy and National Grid. It would 
uniquely involve capacity reserved on the pipelines pri-
marily for electricity generation. 
— The Access Northeast completed an open season on 
May 1, 2015. 
FIGURE 6. Map of New England Interstate Pipelines and LNG Terminals
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FIGURE 7. Proposed Gas Pipeline Expansions
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ACP (Alternative Compliance Payment)
AIM (Algonquin Incremental Market)
C2C (Continent to Coast)
CAISO (California ISO)
CLF (Conservation Law Foundation)
CRA (Charles River Associates)
CSO (Capacity Supply Obligation)
DPU (Department of Public Utilities)
DR (Demand Response) 
EPSA (Electric Power Supply Association)
FCA (Forward Capacity Auction)
FCM (Forward Capacity Market)
FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission)
FPA (Federal Power Act)
GWh (gigawatt-hours)
ICR (Installed Capacity Requirement)
IOU (Investor Owned Utility)
ISO (Independent System Operator)
ISO-NE (Independent System Operator-New England)
KWh (kilowatt-hour)
LDC (Local Distribution Company)





NED (Northeast Energy Direct)
NEMA (North Eastern Massachusetts)
NEPOOL (New England Power Pool)
NERC (North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation)
NYISO (New York ISO)
PFP (Pay for Performance)
PJM (PJM Interconnection LLC)
PNGTS (Portland Natural Gas Transmission System)
PP&L (People’s Power & Light)
PUC (Public Utility Commission)
PURA (Public Utilities Regulatory Agency)
PV (photo-voltaic)
REC (Renewable Energy Certificates)
ROE (Return on Equity)
RPS (Renewable Portfolio Standard)
SBC (System Benefit Charge)
T&D (Transmission and Distribution) 
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